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EXHAUSTION OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS BEYOND THE EUROPEAN
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GRAY MARKET
"The parallel importation of unauthorized genuine goods is commonly
referred to as the gray market."' The gray market arises when an entrepreneur
purchases legitimately trademarked goods in a lower priced market and then
resells the goods in a higher priced market. Thus, the gray marketer reaps the
benefit of higher profits by selling the products in a geographic area in which
the proprietor of the trademark has authorized the sale of the product to certain
individuals but not to the parallel importer. It is in this sense that gray market
goods are unauthorized. Even though the imported goods are genuine, as
opposed to counterfeit or pirated goods, the right to distribute the product in
a particular geographic area is not allocated to the parallel importer
Even though the gray marketer is selling the trademarked goods at a
reduced price, there are several reasons that the gray marketer is able to profit
from this type of activity.
First, some independent and unauthorized importers can take
advantage of currency fluctuations and therefore buy when
the time is right in a particular foreign market. Second,
unauthorized importers take advantage of promotional and
advertising campaigns paid for by the authorized distributors.

J.D. 2000, University of Georgia.
Richard M. Andrade, Comment, The ParallelImportation of Unauthorized Genuine
Goods: Analysis and Observations of the Gray Market, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 409, 409

(1993).

2 See id.
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Third, the authorized dealers are responsible for service of the
goods and sometimes an entire product line throughout the
life of the product, whereas the unauthorized importer usually
disappears after the first sale.3
To understand the gray market, one must have a basic understanding of the
function of trademarks and the principle of exhaustion of trademark rights. A
trademark is any "word, slogan, design, picture, or any other symbol used to
identify and distinguish goods." The Council of the European Communities
has also defined the trademark: "A trade mark may consist of any sign capable
of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal names,
designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, provided
that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one
undertaking from those of other undertakings." 5
The historical function of the trademark is, as these definitions suggest, to
help consumers identify and distinguish goods in the marketplace. The earliest
historical function of the trademark was to aid consumers in identifying the
source or origin of the goods put on the market. As trading expanded and
goods were transported to distant markets, the trademark took on the additional
function of being a symbol of quality for consumers who were far removed
from the producers of the trademarked goods.6
Additionally, trademarks protect the expectations ofconsumers with regard
to goods because a trademark functions as a guarantee of a certain quality.7

Hillary A. Kremen, Note, Caveat Venditor: InternationalApplication of the FirstSale
Doctrine, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 161, 162 (1997). As Judge Leval explained in
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, the phenomenon of taking advantage of marketing campaigns
paid for by the authorized distributors, known as free riding, occurs when advertising
expenditures and public relations efforts on behalf ofthe trademark owner to promote its product
are taken advantage of by the gray market sellers who ride free on the owner's publicity. See
589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also A Grey Area, THE ECONOMIST, June 13, 1998, at
61, 62 (quoting Hugh Hansen, a law professor at Fordham University, who argues the barriers
to gray marketers are justified due to the fact that gray trade "involves nothing more than free
riding by people who create nothing").
4 J. THoMAs MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY's DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

443 (2d ed. 1995).
Council Directive 89/104/EEC, art. 2, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1, 2.
6 See Gregory W. Hotaling, Comment, Ideal Standard v. IHT: In the European Union, Must
a Company Surrender its National Trademark Rights When it Assigns its Trademark?, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1178, 1194-95 (1996).
' See John E. Somorjai, The Evolution of a Common Market: Limits Imposed on the

Protection of NationalIntellectual PropertyRights in the EuropeanEconomic Community, 9
INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 431, 437 (1992).
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Businesses also rely on the trademark "to establish their reputation, distinguish
competitor's products, advertise, and market goods."'
Thus, trademarks
protect the expectations of consumers; however, unlike other intellectual
property rights such as patents or copyrights, trademarks do not represent a
significant investment in creative effort. A trademark is simply a unique
symbol that differentiates one product from others.9 This difference suggests
that in some circumstances the trademark should be treated differently from
patents and copyrights with respect to exhaustion because patents and
copyrights do protect a significant investment in creative effort.
The principle of exhaustion prohibits a trademark owner from using its
trademark rights as a barrier to other importers desiring to trade in its goods.'0
The doctrine functions as a limitation on intellectual property rights.
Exhaustion provides that the rights, which an intellectual property holder
acquires with respect to articles and which are patented, copyrighted, or
trademarked, expire in certain cases after the first sale of the protected goods
on the market." The consequence is that a subsequent purchaser can resell the
article without infringing on the intellectual property holder's rights under the
mark. 12
As previously noted, when goods are traded in contravention of the
marketing scheme of the intellectual property right holder, they are called gray
market goods or parallel imports. There is a critical link between parallel
imports and the exhaustion of intellectual property rights, such as the
trademark. Whether retailers are able to import gray market goods will depend3
on whether the intellectual property rights were exhausted by previous sales.
Exhaustion occurs within the European Economic Area (EEA), the fifteen
nations comprising the European Union (EU) plus Norway, Iceland, and
Liechtenstein, 4 upon the first marketing of a trademarked good within the
EEA." Thus, subsequent sales of goods within the EEA are not fettered by
proprietors of trademarks asserting their rights to block imports because their

8 Minde Glenn Browning, International Trademark Law: A Pathfinder and Selected
Bibliography, 4 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 339, 339 (1994) (citing McCARTHY'S DESK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 340 (1 st ed. 1991)).
9 See Hotaling, supra note 6, at 195.
'0 See Rebecca Harrison, Silhouette vs. Hartlauer: The End ofDiscountedDesignerLabels?,
BRAND STRATEGY, July 24, 1998, at 23.

" See Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and International Harmonization of the
ExhaustionofRights Doctrine, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER& HIGH TECH. L.J. 445,447 (1997).
12 See id.
13 See id.
"

See Harrison, supra note 10, at 23.

"

See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 470-71.
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rights under the mark are exhausted. In this way, the EU encourages the gray
market within its borders.1 6 However, the EU's position on the exhaustion of
trademark rights pertaining to goods first marketed in a territory outside the
EEA is quite different. Recently, in Silhouette v. Hartlauer,the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) interpreted the European Community (EC) legislation
pertaining to trademarks and concluded that the principle of exhaustion of
rights does not apply when products are first marketed outside the EEA. 7
Thus, the proprietor of the trademark can restrain parallel imports from nonmember countries.
The EC legislation relating to trademarks is contained in the First Council
Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988.'8 The directive makes explicit
its intent to harmonize the intellectual property laws regarding trademarks
among the member states:
Whereas the trade mark laws at present applicable in the
Member States contain disparities which may impede the free
movement of goods and freedom to provide services and may
distort competition within the common market; whereas it is
therefore necessary, in view of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, to approximate the laws of
Member States.' 9

16 See John A. Tessensohn & Shusaku Yamamoto, The BBS Supreme Court Case-A Cloth
Too Shortfor an OBI and Too Longfor a Tasuki, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 721
(1997) (explaining that the principle of intra-community exhaustion has developed in the EU
because of an express treaty obligation under articles 30 to 46 of the Treaty of Rome, discussed
infra, that mandates member states to provide for the free movement of goods between the EU
member nations); see also A Grey Area, supra note 3, at 61 (explaining the principle of intracommunity exhaustion upon first sale developed "to ensure the free movement of goods within
the EU's single market").
17 See A Grey Area, supra note 3, at 61 (noting that the ruling will be controversial either
way because "some will see it as a defeat for free trade: others as a victory for intellectual
property rights").
's "Directives are addressed to member states which must modify or enact national laws so
as to conform with the directive. They are issued when there is a need to lay down general
principles and goals. Member states must take the necessary steps to achieve the results required
by the directive." Beryl R. Jones, An Introductionto the EuropeanEconomic Community and
Intellectual Properties, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 678 (1992). Directives have had special
significance in the area of intellectual property rights and have been used to drive the
community's harmonization efforts. See id. at 679.
,' Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1.
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Article seven of the directive deals specifically with the exhaustion of the
rights conferred by a trademark.20 The directive calls for the exhaustion of
trademark rights upon the first sale in the EU made with the proprietor's
consent, provided that an exception does not apply. However, an open
question remained with respect to national rules, which provided for
international exhaustion-a question decided by the ECJ in Silhouette v.
Hartlauer2 In typical fashion, the exhaustion case was brought before the
ECJ on questions for preliminary rulings by national courts to further litigation
pending before those national courts.22
Although EC legislation provides for national exhaustion of trademark
rights once a product is first sold within the EU, it was unclear whether goods
first sold in non-member countries could be subject to exhaustion upon first
sale. Exhaustion in this scenario would be international exhaustion-the
intellectual property holder's rights with respect to the trademark would expire
upon the first sale of the goods regardless of whether or not they were first
sold in a non-member state. A lack of uniformity in the national rules
regarding exhaustion of trademark rights developed within the EU with some
member states providing for international exhaustion of trademark rights and
others not-a situation which would have led to internal markets being
distorted.23
Silhouette arose out of the following facts. Hartlauer, an Austrian retailer
capitalizing on its reputation for low prices, wanted to sell the high-end
spectacles Silhouette produced. Silhouette, another Austrian based company,
refused to permit Hartlauer to sell its spectacles fearing its reputation would
be tarnished by having its goods sold in a discount store. Nevertheless,
Hartlauer obtained twenty-one thousand pairs of outmoded spectacles that had
been marketed in Bulgaria and put them up for sale in Austrian stores without
Silhouette's consent.24
20 Id. art. 7(1) ("The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation
to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the
proprietor or with his consent."). However, article 7(2) carves out an exception to community
exhaustion if "there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they
have been put on the market." Id. art. 7(2).
2 Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int'l Schmied v. Hartlauer Hadelsgesellschaft, 1998 E.C.R. I4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998).
22 See David C.L. Perkins& Marleen Van Kerckhove, LicensingIntellectualPropertyRights
in the EU: The Community Exhaustion Doctrine, in Patents 1997, at 419, 421 (PLI Pat.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 490, 1997).
23 See Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-4812.
24 See id. at 1-4806.
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Silhouette brought an action against Hartlauer seeking to enjoin Hartlauer
from selling the spectacles under Silhouette's trademark, and the case
eventually made its way to the Austrian High Court; however, the Austrian
court did not answer Hartlauer's contentions. Instead, the court concluded that
the issue's resolution turned on EC law and applied to the ECJ for clarification.25
In a preliminary opinion issued by Advocate General Jacobs, he addressed
the critical issue in Silhouette,namely, whether the inference to be drawn from
the language "in the Community" found in Directive 89/104/EEC article 7(1)
requires a non-exhaustion principle for goods first marketed outside the EEA.26
The Advocate General concluded that Directive 89/104/EEC did not require
member states to impose a principle of international exhaustion." Had that
been the intention, article 7(1) would not have limited the trademark holder's
right to prohibit the importation of goods that had first been marketed with his
consent in the EC.28 The Advocate General also reasoned that the language of
article 7(1) implicitly precludes international exhaustion because of the
language limiting article 7(1) to the EC. 29 The Advocate General concluded
that article 7(1) should be read restrictively as being the only
situation in
30
which exhaustion should defeat a trademark owner's claim.
The Advocate General reasoned that article 7(1) is a derogation from the
rights conferred on, and guaranteed to, the trademark owner under article 5(1)
of the directive and should therefore be construed narrowly.3 ' Article 5
provides the rights conferred by a trademark:

25 See id. at

1-4807-08.

See id. at 1-4802.
27 Seeid. at 1-4810.
2' See id.
29 See id. But see W.R. Cornish, Trademarks: Portcullisfor the EEA?, 20 E.I.P.R. 172
26

(1998) (suggesting that the commission's original directive was intended to apply to imports
from outside the EC-its goal was to provide for international exhaustion). Cornish notes that
the commission was subsequently influenced to insert the provision "in the Community" in
response to pressure from varying sectors of the EU and international industries. It is this
provision that has created the controversy about international exhaustion. The supporters of the
amendment maintain that the text of the directive grants the power to employ trademark rights
to prevent parallel imports from non-EEA states. See id.
30 See Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. at 14810 through 4811.
3' But see Cornish, supra note 29, at 175 (arguing that the Advocate General is correct in
viewing exhaustion principles as a derogation of intellectual property rights, but that it is
inconsistent with the court's willingness to apply broad derogation principles with respect to the
internal market to totally disregard this reality and interpret them so narrowly with respect to the
international market). Cornish argues: "A derogation ought to be interpreted as broadly or
narrowly as its policy imperatives require." Id. at 175 n.25.
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(1) The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor
the exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled
to prevent all parties not having his consent from using in the
course of trade: (a) any sign which is identical with the trade
mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with
those for which the trade mark is registered; (b) any sign
where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade
mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services
covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes
the likelihood of association between the sign and the trademark. (2) Any Member State may also provide that the
proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not
having its consent from using in the course of trade any sign
which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in
relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for
which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a
reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark. a2
The opinion was based on a reading of the directive as a whole and relied
heavily on the fact that the directive was intended to ensure that trademarks
3a
"enjoy the same protection under the legal systems of all Member States.
In addition, support for the Advocate General's conclusions may be found
in the EC trademark regulation because of its parallels with the directive. 4
The regulation contains exhaustion principles similar to those in the directive
that operate within what is clearly intended as a comprehensive regime for
regulating protections of the EC trademark. The Advocate General concluded,
in light of these factors, that article 7(1) of the directive precludes member
states from adopting the principle of international exhaustion.

32

Council Directive 89/104/EEC, art. 5, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1.

33 Cornish, supra note 29, at 175 (explaining that the Advocate General was driven to his

conclusion "largely as a consequence of concluding that it cannot be left to Member States to
apply their differing national rules on the subject"). However, Cornish also criticizes the
Advocate General's conclusion as being "quite unclear why this should be the general upshot."
Id.
14 See 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1.
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The ECJ proceeded to decide the case in the same manner as the Advocate
General's opinion, as is usually the practice. 35 To no avail, Hartlauer
maintained before the ECJ that Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988
left member states free to provide in their national law for exhaustion, not only
in respect of products put on the market in the EEA but also of those put on the
market in non-member communities. In essence, Hartlauer argued that
Silhouette had exhausted its trademark rights by selling the goods in Bulgaria.
The ECJ was called upon to determine whether "[n]ational rules providing
for exhaustion of trade mark rights in respect of products put on the market
outside the EEA [international exhaustion] under that mark by the proprietor
or with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the [directive]., 36 The court
concluded that "the directive cannot be interpreted as leaving it open to the
Member States to provide in their domestic, law for exhaustion of the rights
conferred by a trade mark in respect of products put on the market in nonmember countries."'3 7 Thus, Hartlauer was blocked from selling the spectacles
it had imported from Bulgaria because Silhouette's rights under the trademark
were still viable.
The goal of harmonization of exhaustion principles with respect to
trademarks proved critically important to the decision. Relying on the recital
previously set out above in the preamble to the directive, the ECJ reasoned that
the directive represented the complete harmonization of the rules pertaining
to the rights conferred by a trademark.38
In addition, the ECJ, without further explanation, cautioned that a situation
in which member states were free to provide for either international exhaustion
or community exhaustion would pose a serious threat to free trade.3 9 The ECJ
suggested that allowing the alternative situation-where one member state
could provide for international exhaustion while others did not-would tend
to promote price differentials between member states, which, according to the
court, is an undesirable consequence.'
Several consequences flow from the court's decision. The decision
strengthened the value of the trademark rights of the manufacturer to the

31 See A Grey Area, supra note 3, at 61 (explaining that the full court usually endorses the
judgments of the Advocate General).
36 Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-4800.
37 Id. at 1-4801.
38 See id. at 1-4811-12.
39 See id. at 1-4812.
40 See id.
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detriment of the consumer. 4' By allowing the international exhaustion
principle to apply, the trademark will function to divide the market and to
exploit price differentials among different markets. The ECJ also limited itself
to considering the matter solely in terms of the effect international exhaustion
would have in relation to community law. The court did not consider42the
possible international ramifications of its decision for the world market.
Several arguments have been advanced in favor of and against the right to
engage in parallel importation. As previously noted, some commentators
argue against parallel importation because gray marketers are, in essence, free
riding on the trademark holder's investments. Others who support free trade
in parallel imports reduce the issue, rather simplistically, solely to the
consumer's interest in getting a good deal. The best approach to the thorny
problem of parallel imports would be to recognize that the issues presented
require a delicate balance of all the interests involved to arrive at a solution.
that accounts for the policies behind trademark restrictions.
In some cases there should be genuine concern about a thriving gray
market. Legitimate reasons may exist for a brand owner to trademark slightly
different products in different geographic areas under the same mark.43 For
example, a manufacturer of diesel fuels may alter the composition of the
product to tailor the product for climactic conditions unique to a geographic
area. In this situation "the gray market holds no protection for the consumer
[who obtains a product not suited to his or her geographic region]. Indeed, the
consumer is badly and dangerously served."" However, it is also hard to
argue against exhaustion in the case where the branded goods are of exactly
the same quality and composition as those marketed in different regions.45
This Note examines the reasons underlying the disparate treatment of the
exhaustion of trademark rights and parallel imports with respect to goods first

4, See A Grey Area, supra note 3, at 61 (arguing trademark law allows right holders to limit
competition on price that damages consumer interests).
42 See id. (explaining that the international community has yet to establish international
trade-rules dealing with trademark rights and other countries are likely to follow the ECJ's
position with respect to international exhaustion). In addition, William Cornish, a specialist in
intellectual property at the University of Cambridge, expressed his reservations about a blanket
prohibition on international exhaustion because of the international effects that are likely to
follow the court's decision. He is quoted as saying that" 'the EU is such a big market that other
companies are bound to retaliate by copying us.' " Id.
41 See Brian March, Brand Names Bite Back, THE LAWYER, Aug. 11, 1998, at 20.
"Id.
4s See id.
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marketed within the EEA and goods first marketed outside the EC as a
consequence of the Silhouette decision.'
Part I of the Note will address the historical treatment of intellectual
property rights, specifically the trademark, within the EC, the economic goals
of the EC, and how the exhaustion principle developed with respect to intracommunity trade against this background.
Part II will examine the developments in trademark exhaustion principles
for goods first sourced outside the EC and why these goods have received
distinct treatment under community law. Part H will also argue that the ECJ
should rethink its blanket prohibition against international exhaustion in favor
of an approach that reflects the current thinking of the court with respect to
parallel importation between the member states.
Specifically, the question to be addressed is why the importation and
subsequent distribution of legitimate goods from outside the EEA should be
deemed an unlawful use in light of the fact that parallel imports of legitimate
goods within the EC itself is lawful. Additionally, this Note will suggest that
the answer to when parallel imports should be considered an unlawful use in
all cases, whether within the EC or importing from sources outside the EC,
should be answered by considering the purposes and policies behind the
trademark and trademark legislation.
Part IH will briefly survey the history of the trademark in the United States
and United States case law regarding trademarks to determine whether an
unbending non-exhaustion approach should be adopted by the EU with respect
to internationally marketed goods, or, on the other hand, whether the case law
of the United States on exhaustion provides guidance for the EU as far as to
what circumstances to apply international exhaustion principles. In conclusion, this Note will examine the policy choices that alternatively support the
protection of the trademark holder's interests and balance the interests of the
manufacturers versus the consumers who will be hurt by the ECJ's inflexible
approach to the international exhaustion question.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXHAUSTION
PRINCIPLE AS APPLIED TO INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE

The European Economic Community arose out of the Treaty of Rome,
otherwise labeled the European Economic Community Treaty (the EEC

" See Silhouette, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-4799.
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Treaty), in 1957.47 In order "[t]o achieve [European] integration, the Treaty
creates four 'economic liberties' existing among the Community's member
states, free movement of goods, free movement of persons, free movement of
services, and free movement of capital. 48
Articles thirty to thirty-six of the Treaty of Rome cover quantitative
restrictions and measures of equivalent effect on imports and exports between
member states. 49 Basically, quantitative restrictions are quotas or absolute
bans on trade. The phrase "measures of equivalent effect" encompasses
intellectual property rights, price controls, and indications of origin. 0
Although a fundamental goal of the EEC Treaty is to promote the free
movement of goods within the community,"1 exceptions under article thirty-six
have been made that allow member states to restrict the free movement of
goods in certain circumstances. 2 Specifically, article thirty-six recognized
that member states must be able to "regulate imports and exports to the extent
necessary to give effect to the national policies that member states considered
of primary importance." 3 Because of this recognition, the EEC Treaty under
article thirty-six justified certain import restrictions grounded in member
state's laws based on intellectual property rights such as trademarks,
copyrights, and patents.54 Thus, a conflict developed between the goal of the
EEC to promote the free movement of goods within the community and the
protection of national intellectual property rights." The EC has sought to
resolve the tension between member states' laws regulating trademarks, which

47 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
"' Somorjai, supra note 7, at 433.
49 See EEC TREATY, supra note 47, arts. 30-36.

SoPETER

OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY UNDER

ARTICLES 30 TO 36 OF THE ROME TREATY 1 (3rd ed. 1996).
s" For example, articles 30 to 34 seek to eliminate measures that might be passed by member
states that would amount to restraints on intra-community trade. EEC TREATY, supra 47, arts.
30-34.
2 See Somorjai, supra note 7, at 434. Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome provides, "The
provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports,
or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy, or public security; the
protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants; the protection of national treasures
possessing artistic, historic, or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property. Suchiprohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between member states." EEC
TREATY, supra note 47, pt. 2, tit. I, art. 36.
s3 Somorjai, supra note 7, at 434.
14 See id.
" See id.
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operate as a restriction on free trade and the free movement of goods through
trademark exhaustion principles.
Il. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUNCTION OF TRADEMARK
RIGHTS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY

First and foremost, intellectual property rights are territorial.5 6 National
law defines the scope of their protection.5 7 Thus their protections vary from
nation to nation.5" Additionally, these rights allow the intellectual property
right holder to control the use and distribution of a work within a country. 9
For example, an individual who owns the copyright for a book in France
cannot, relying on the French copyright, control the reproduction and sale of
the work outside of France. 60 However, the intellectual property holder is
permitted to block the distribution and sale of the work in France.6' The work,
which has been lawfully produced in another country, is a gray market good,
and its importation will be barred unless the principle of exhaustion applies.
As previously noted, the exhaustion principle provides that intellectual
property rights expire upon the first sale of the protected work or good. 6 ' As
a result, the owner can no longer control the distribution or sale of his
protected work or goods. The EC applies this principle to intra-community
trade. Thus, once a protected intellectual property has been sold in the EC
with the
owner's consent, it can be freely imported into any other member
63
state.

Because applying for a trademark in each member state of the EC would
be a cumbersome process, the community has sought to develop a trademark
policy applicable throughout the community, thereby eliminating the need to
apply for individual trademarks in each member state."

'6

See Jones, supra note 18, at 682-83.

" See id. at 683.

58See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
6 See id. at 683.
62 See supra text accompanying note 11.
63 See Jones, supra note 18, at 684.
4 Council Regulation 40/94, art. 13, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1, 2. Article 13 provides:

1. A Community trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use
in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community
under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where
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In order to understand the EC's stance with regard to international
exhaustion and to assess it critically, it is important to understand the
traditional function of the trademark and the case law regarding the trademark
with respect to intra-community trade. EC law has focused on protecting the
specific subject matter of a trademark and the essential function of a
trademark. The specific subject matter of a trademark is:
the guarantee that the right holder has the exclusive right to
use that trademark for the purpose of placing products
protected by the trademark into circulation for the first time.
Its purpose is to protect the owner of the trademark from
competitors who wish to take advantage of the status or
reputation of the trademark.6 5
The idea of protecting the specific subject matter of trademarks was first
enunciated by the ECJ in Centrafarm B. V v. Winthrop B. V66 This case
involved Centrafarm, a parallel importer which sold pharmaceuticals in the
Netherlands where the goods were priced higher than in the United Kingdom.67
Winthrop, the producer, registered its trademark for the pharmaceuticals in
both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.6 Winthrop relied on its Dutch
trademark to argue that Centrafarm was prohibited under article thirty-six from
importing and reselling the pharmaceuticals to take advantage of the price
discrepancies. 69
In order to determine the extent of Winthrop's trademark rights under
article thirty-six, the court noted that "Article 36 in fact only admits of
derogations from the free movement of goods where such derogations are
justified for the purpose of safeguarding rights which constitute the specific
subject-matter of [the] property." 70 The court reasoned that because Winthrop
had put its pharmaceutical product in the market for the first time in the United
Kingdom, the specific subject matter of the trademark had been protected.7'
Thus, Winthrop was barred from using Dutch trademark law to prevent

the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on
the market.
65 Somorjai, supra note 7, at 440.
Case 16/74, Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V., 1974 E.C.R. 1183.
67See id.
6 Seeid. at 1184.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 1190.
71See id.
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Centrafarm from parallel importation. According to the court, such an
obstacle to the free movement of goods was not justified where the product
had been put on the market in a legal manner in the member state from which
it had been imported.73 In other words, because the specific subject matter of
the trademark had been protected by marketing the product in the United
Kingdom and there could be no question of abuse or infringement of the
trademark, Winthrop's rights under the trademark were exhausted throughout
the EC.
The position taken by the court in Silhouette with respect to international
exhaustion clearly diverges from Centrafarm. Any reference to the protective
function of the specific subject matter of the trademark or to the right to put
the product into the market for the first time, does not appear anywhere in the
court's analysis.
The court has also applied the concept of the essential function of
trademarks to further define the scope of intellectual property rights under the
trademark. Therefore, the court will examine the specific subject matter of the
trademark as well as its essential function when resolving disputes about
possibly infringing practices. The court has infused the concept of origin as
a safeguard against consumer confusion into the essential function of the
trademark, at one point characterizing the essential function as a guarantor of
"the identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or ultimate
user by enabling him without any possibility of confusion to distinguish that
9175
product from products which have another origin....
In Hoffman LaRoche v. Centrafarm, Centrafarm reaffixed the original
manufacturer's trademark to a pharmaceutical originally for sale in the United
Kingdom and offered the repackaged product for sale in the.Netherlands.76
The court concluded that Centrafarm could not repackage Hoffman LaRoche' s
Valium pills that it had purchased in the United Kingdom and resell them in
Germany without violating Hoffman LaRoche's German trademark rights.
The court's reason was that the consumer was not adequately informed about
the origin of the product and guaranteed of its condition.77 Thus, the court

72 See Centrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. at 1190.
73Id.
74See id.
7'Robert S. Smith, The Unresolved Tension Between Trademark Protection and Free
Movement of Goods in the European Community, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 89, 90 (1992)
(quoting Case C-10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. HAG GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, 3758, [1990]
3 C.M.L.R. 571, 608 (1990)).
76 See Case 102/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1139, 1141, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 217, 220 (1978).
'n See id. at 1163-64.
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focused not only on the intellectual property holder's rights but also on the
consumer's interest in being able to identify the origin of the product.
Ideal Standard v. IHT is another case involving trademark rights and the
exhaustion principle.7 ' Here, the court considered whether or not an assignment of trademark rights exhausted them. In reaching its decision, the court
relied on the doctrine of consent set out in Hag lI.79 In refusing to hold that an
assignment of trademark rights amounted to consent, the court infused the
concept of control into its consent analysis. In Ideal Standard,construing the
term "consent" quite differently from common understanding, the court
reasoned that, due to a lack of control, consent to an assignment is not the
consent required for exhaustion. 0
Additionally, the court in Ideal Standard implicitly relied on the
trademark's essential function in reaching its decision. The free movement of
goods principle was subordinated to the essential function of the trademark-allowing consumers to identify the origin or quality of trademarked
goods. The court's conclusion was necessary in the case of assignments
because different quality goods could be manufactured under the same
trademark-a situation that would create significant consumer confusion.
Thus, the court's decision benefits consumers by protecting their expectations
of quality and incidentally benefits proprietors of trademarks by allowing them
to restrain parallel trade.
Given the reasons put forth by the court for choosing to either protect the
intellectual property holder's rights under the trademark or for opting for
exhaustion of the trademark rights, it is difficult to reconcile the EC's position
with respect to intra-community trade with its position with regard to
international trade recently enunciated in Silhouette. As previously noted, the
EC examines several factors when determining whether to apply the principle
of exhaustion to trademark rights.
In Silhouette, the issue was whether a trademark should be treated as
exhausted by the marketing of goods abroad that legitimately bear the
trademark. In resolution of the issue the court adopted an inflexible approach.
It provided that the trademark on goods first marketed outside the EEA would
not be exhausted in all cases without exception. It has been argued that this
inflexible approach is the wrong position for the EU to adopt and that certain
71

Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik v. Ideal-Standard, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2789,

[1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994).
79 In HagII, the court adopted the doctrine of consent, stating that exhaustion of intellectual
property rights occurs only with the owner's consent to putting its product into circulation. Case
10/89, SA CNL- Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571 (1990).
so Id.
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exceptions should apply that carefully balance the policies and .purposes
behind trademark law."' For example, with respect to intra-community
exhaustion principles upon first sale of trademarked goods within the EEA,
certain exceptions do apply.82
To determine the precise delineation of which exceptions should apply and
when they should apply under the EU's exhaustion doctrine, it may be helpful
to examine the United States position on international exhaustion upon first
sale. The United States approach may have some lessons for the EU and the
ECJ's unduly restrictive point of view with respect to the principle of nonexhaustion recently laid out in Silhouette.
IV. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES LAW ON TRADEMARKS AND
THE GRAY MARKET AND THE GUIDANCE IT PROVIDES

The United States does not apply the principle of international exhaustion
in all cases. Rather, whether the principle of exhaustion will or will not apply
turns primarily on whether the public is or is not likely to be confused or
misled about the quality of the goods. 3 In gray market situations, there are
often substantial similarities between the gray market and the authorized
goods; however, in other cases, substantial differences exist. There are
convincing policy reasons for choosing to treat these distinct situations
differently with regard to the principle of exhaustion." Material differences
in the goods injure the local trademark holder's business, and gray market
selling in this situation should be an actionable infringement. 5 But goods that
are substantially similar present a different question. It borders on insensible
to regard the importation of gray market goods as damaging to the local
trademark holder provided "it can be proven that gray market goods are for all
practical purposes the same as the authorized version. .* ,,86 The practice of
selling these substantially similar goods should not be considered an
actionable infringement.8 7

83 See Cornish, supra note 29, at 172.
82

For example, in ParfumsChristianDiorv.Evora, [1998] E.T.M.R. 26, [1998] R.P.C. 166,

an exception to the community rule of exhaustion upon first sale was established by the court.
This exception was grounded in the function and policies behind trademark law.
8 See Cornish, supra note 29, at 173.
' See SETH E. LiPNER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAY MARKET GOODS 45

(1990).

" See id. at 46-47.
86 Id. at 45.
87 See id.
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In the United States, trademark law developed in an attempt to accommodate the multiple purposes of the trademark-ensuring the quality and source
of the product, as well as protecting the owner's investment in the trademark.
Two sources of United States law may in some circumstances prohibit or
prevent parallel imports, thereby protecting United States trademark rights
after a first sale. Those provisions are section 42 of the Lanham Act and
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930. These statutory provisions, discussed
below, have applications for any discussion of parallel imports. The scope of
these provisions will set the permissible boundaries for gray market activities
in the United States.
The history of trademark law in the United States predates either statutory
source of industrial property protections. Prior to the enactment of either
provision, in A Bourois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, one of the earliest cases dealing
with the parallel importation of goods, the Supreme Court set down many of
the important precedents concerning the functions of trademarks in American
law that endure today.8
In Katzel, the Supreme Court established the principle of the territoriality
of trademarks. 9 Previously, a view of universality applied. Universality
provided that if a trademark was lawfully affixed to merchandise in one
country, the mark would follow the merchandise in the stream of commerce
barring the possibility that the merchandise could infringe trademark rights
although transported to another country where the exclusive right to the mark
was held by someone other than the owner of the merchandise." The
consequence of this position was that trademark holders could not restrain
parallel importation of genuinely marked goods purchased abroad and offered
for sale in the United States. As a direct result of the decision in Katzel, today
a principle of territoriality applies. The doctrinal implication of territoriality
is that trademark rights guaranteed under United States law would not be
exhausted by first sales outside of the United States. 9' In announcing the new
principle of territoriality, the Supreme Court addressed the purposes and
limitations of trademark law. Specifically, the Court sought to answer the
following questions: whether a trademark is to be primarily protected for
purposes of protecting local trademark owners' investment in their business
See id. at 13.
'9 A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
88

90 See Walter J. Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Good Will, 47
VA. L. REV. 733, 733-34 (1961).

9' See Donnelly, supra note 11, at 455 (explaining that this is not an accurate reflection of
state of trademark law in the United States because the principle has been limited by subsequent
decisions construing Katzel narrowly).
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or whether a trademark is exclusively limited to guarding the public against
confusion concerning the source and quality of the trademarked goods.
Viewing the trademark as exclusively for the benefit of consumers without
regard for the goodwill of businesses, which the trademarks are relied on to
produce, is a limiting position that the Supreme Court did not embrace. 92
Rather, the Supreme Court took a more expansive view of the functions of the
trademark.93
In Katzel, the plaintiff had purchased the United States business and
trademark rights for JAVA, a French cosmetic powder manufactured in France
by the seller who continued to operate its business in France. 94 The defendant,
finding that the rate of exchange created a favorable climate for selling the
face powder in the United States, purchased genuine JAVA powder in France,
imported it into the United States, and sold it under the JAVA mark. 95 Even
though the powders were substantially the same with respect to quality, the
Court nevertheless held that the defendants were barred from making such
sales because an infringement of the United States trademark rights would
occur.96 In so holding, Justice Holmes recognized the multiple functions of the
trademark:
Ownership of the goods does not carry the right to sell them
with a specific mark. It does not necessarily carry the right to
sell them at all in a given place.... It is said that the trademark here is that of the French house and truly indicates the
origin of the goods. But that is not accurate. It is the trademark of the plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in
law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods
come from the plaintiff although not made by it. It was sold
and could only be sold with the good will of the business that
the plaintiff bought.9 7
Holmes made clear in his opinion that trademarks "serve[] a function beyond
that of mere source identifier, [and] that [they] represent broader concepts of

92 See LIPNER, supra

note 84, at 17 (noting that by 1920 the Court seemed willing to protect
a trademark owner's interest in goodwill).
9'See id. at 18.
94Katzel, 260 U.S. at 689-90.
9'See id. at 691.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 692.
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business goodwill."9' Here, a foreign firm sold the rights to register and use
its trademark in the United States to an independent United States company
only later to import and distribute its goods in the United States. Allowing the
parallel imports in this scenario would work an injustice because the United
States company had invested in developing the goodwill of the mark.
However, it is equally clear that Holmes did not intend his opinion to be a
blanket proscription on the importation and sale of gray market goods by his
emphasis on the purchase of the company's goodwill. Therefore, the
restriction against parallel imports enunciated by the Court in Katzel can be
limited to the factual situation in which the trademark owner has purchased the
goodwill of the business and is deserving of the protections which the
trademark may afford to protect the owner's business. Thus, a complete
prohibition of the parallel importation of genuine goods may be avoided.
Since the decision in Katzel, several sources oflegislation have been passed
that may in some circumstances prohibit or prevent parallel imports. For
example, some protection for United States trademark holders after a first sale
may be found in section 42 of the Lanham Act and section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930.
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any
merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or
the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or
association created or organized within, the United States, and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office."
Section 42 of the Lanham Act provides that "no article of imported merchandise, which shall copy or simulate the name of the [sic] any domestic
manufacture, or manufacturer ...which shall copy or simulate a trademark
registered in accordance with the provisions of [the Lanham Act] ...shall be
admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States."'0
Further, section 32 of the Lanham Act provides:

98 LIPNER, supra note 84, at 18.

" The Tariff Act of 1930 § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1994). The Tariff Act was passed in
response to the Court of Appeals decision in A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d
Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), allowing for parallel imports of genuine goods bearing
the same trademark as merchandise of the United States. See LiPNER, supra note 84, at 19.
'0o15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994).
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Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods or services on or in connection with such use is likely
to cause consumer confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive... registrant....'0'
Additionally, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representations of
fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person.., shall be liable in a civil action
by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.° 2
Sections 32 and 43 address when gray goods infringe upon a trademark.
These provisions of the Lanham Act clearly require that a likelihood of
confusion exist before a finding of liability is made. Further, section 42 of the
Lanham Act addresses imported goods bearing infringing marks.
The Supreme Court has also examined the legality of the importation of
genuine goods under section 526 of the Tariff Act in K-Mart Corp. v.
03
Cartier.1
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority of the Court, explained
the several contexts in which the gray market may arise: (I) where a domestic
company "purchases from an independent foreign firm the rights to register
and use" the foreign firm's trademark in the United States; (2) where a
"domestic firm registers the United States trademark for goods that are

'0'
Id. § I114(l)(a).
§ 1125(a).
486 U.S. 281 (1988).

'o2 Id.
'o3
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manufactured abroad by an affiliated manufacturer"; and (3) where the
"domestic holder of a United States trademark authorizes an independent
foreign manufacturer" to exclusively use the trademark in a particular foreign
location, but not in the United States. 1°4 In the second example, three subcases arise: "[(a)] the U.S. company is a subsidiary of the foreign firm; [(b)]
the U.S. firm is the parent of its overseas manufacturing subsidiary; and [(c)]
the U.S. firm opens a foreign plant, which is not separately incorporated and
the assets of which are owned by the domestic firm.,, 0 '
The Court concluded that customs regulations implementing section 526
of the Tariff Act did not bar the importation of all gray market goods."° The
customs regulations at issue in K-Mart Corp. created two exceptions to the
blanket prohibition on the importation of genuine gray goods. The first was
the "common control" exception exemplified by the second example and the
sub-classes. Second, the regulations created an "authorized use" exception as
shown by the third example. The Court held the "authorized use" exception
to be inconsistent with the plain language of section 526.107 However, the
Court upheld the "common control" exception.'0 8 Thus, the Court allows
parallel imports of genuine goods where the United States trademark for goods
manufactured abroad is registered by a domestic firm that is either (a) a
subsidiary of the foreign manufacturer, (b) the parent of the foreign manufacturer, or (c) where the United States firm is operatifig a foreign plant which is
not separately incorporated and owned by the domestic firm. The bottom line
in both Katzel and K-Mart is the nature of the corporate relationship. Also, the
Court will look to whether the firms structure their relationships in a way to
reap the full benefit of their investments or whether the domestic companies
would stand to lose the benefit of their investments ifparallel importation were
permitted.
United States courts have also interpreted the scope of trademark
protections against parallel imports in the context of the Lanham Act. On
several occasions, courts have concluded that the territorial protections of the
Lanham Act will protect a merchant with a registered trademark in the United
States where two merchants sell physically different products in the same
market and under the same name.' °9 The court in Societe Des ProduitsNestle
recognized the dual purposes of trademark law: protecting the bundle of
'04

Id. at 286-87.

105
'06

LIPNER, supra note 84, at 113.
See 486 U.S. at 281.

'07

See id. at 291.

1o8See id.
'09 See Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633 (1 st Cir. 1992).
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characteristics that consumers come to identify with a particular product so as
to avoid consumer confusion and protecting the trademark owner's goodwill.
Even though goods may be properly trademarked abroad, the court concluded
that they still might be inappropriate for sale in the United States if physically
different because of the likelihood of confusion standard under sections 43(a)
and 32 of the Lanham Act. " Defining the difference that must exist between
the products before the Lanham Act will come in to play to "honor[] the
important linkage between trademark law and geography[,]"" the court stated2
the differences must be "material... between similarly marked goods. ... "11
In addition, the court stated that the material difference must be a difference
"likely to confuse consumers.... ,,s Thus, unlike the current position of the
ECJ, the United States courts have permitted products identical to a domestic
product to be imported into the United States under the same mark because of
the absence of Lanham Act violations." 4 The court went on to find material
differences between the two similarly marked brands of chocolates based on
the configuration, composition, and packaging of the chocolates." 5 The gray
market chocolates manufactured for the domestic market were made of
different ingredients, contained 5 percent more milk than their high-end
counterparts, came in a larger variety of shapes, and were packaged differently. "6 Thus, the court concluded that a material difference existed between
the products likely to cause consumer confusion and that the first sale doctrine
did not apply to prevent the trademark holder from stopping the imports.' 7
In a case strikingly similar to Silhouette,the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Martin 's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond & Gem
Trading USA, Co.," 8 held that material differences could include mere
differences in style between high-end products and their gray market

"o See id. at 637.
111Id.
112 Id.

Id. at 640.
11 See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

"'

(distinguishing cases where gray market goods are "physically identical" to the authorized
goods); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Grananda Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68,73 (2nd Cir.
1987) (barring importation of gray market dolls because the dolls were not intended for sale in
the United States and were materially different from the dolls intended for the domestic market
and sold in the United States). The court stated, "It is this difference that creates the confusion
over the source of the product and results in a loss of [the trademark owner's] goodwill." Id.
...
See Societe Des ProduitsNestle, 982 F.2d at 642-43.
116

See id.

117 See id.
"a

112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997).
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counterparts." 9 In Martin'sHerend Imports, Herendi, the foreign manufacturer of luxury porcelain figures, registered its mark "Herend" in the United
States and entered into an exclusive distributorship agreement with the United
States company, Martin's Herend Imports (MHI). 20 The owners of Diamond
& Gem Trading USA, Co. (Diamond & Gem), the Juhaszs, obtained genuine
Herendi goods bearing the mark from several sources and sold the figurines
in the United States.' 2 ' In finding a material difference, the court first noted
that the goods offered for sale by Diamond & Gem were not all offered for
sale in the United States by MHI.122 The court proceeded to note the minor
stylistic differences between the authorized and the gray goods. 23 For
example, some of the figurines were different shapes and were painted With
different patterns and colors. 24 The court concluded that these differences
were material and rejected an argument that the first sale doctrine protected the
importation of the gray goods by Diamond & Gem. 125 Although the first sale
doctrine generally protects a gray marketer from incurring liability for
trademark infringement for subsequent sales of trademarked goods, the court
declined to apply the first sale doctrine in the case of an unauthorized gray
market importer.2 6 The court apparently tried to strike a balance between the
interests of trademark holders and consumers based on the policies behind
trademark law. In doing so, however, the court derogated one of the most
27
basic functions of trademark law-protecting the consumer from confusion.
Indeed, it is a bedrock principle that a likelihood of confusion must exist
before an action for infringement may be maintained under the Lanham Act.121
It is hard to see how the consumer could be confused by genuine goods that
originated from the same Herendi factory in Hungary. Thus, the Fifth

"1 See id. at 1301-02; see also Arif S. Haq, Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond &
Gem Trading USA, Co.: Gray Market Goods; Reason Makes a Run for the Border,23 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381, 382 (1998) (discussing the court's opinion).
120 See 112 F.3d at 1298.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 1302.
12 See id.

124 See id.
125 See id. at 1302-03.
6 See id. at 1303. But see

NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit ABCO, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir.

1987) ("Once a trademark owner sells his product, the buyer ordinarily may resell the product
under the original mark without incurring any trademark law liability.").
127 See Haq, supra note 119, at 403.
12 See id. at 392. Specifically, Haq notes that "without a finding that consumers are likely
to be confused by an allegedly infringing use, a plaintiff cannot recover for trademark
infringement" under the Lanham Act. Id. at 391.
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Circuit's decision undermines the policy behind the material difference
standard-a standard intended to place limits on the territoriality of trademark
law. The court erred in its conclusion that material differences existed
between the authorized and unauthorized goods. The decision in Societe Des
ProduitsNestle 129 is the appropriate standard for material differences-where
real differences exist in product composition that may likely confuse
consumers.
V. CONCLUSION

Several solutions present themselves for the ECJ based on the foregoing
analysis of United States trademark law. The ECJ should not follow the
approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in Martin'sHerendsImports. Instead, the
ECJ should permit parallel imports, consistent with its policies within the EC,
whenever consumer confusion is not likely to result from the parallel imports
from abroad. Thus, a policy of non-exhaustion after an international first sale
should only govern where a likelihood of confusion exists as to the source or
quality of the imported merchandise. This would properly balance the
interests of trademark law-protecting consumers against confusion and
protecting the goodwill of businesses.
Recently, the ECJ passed up the opportunity to limit the applicability of
Silhouette despite public sentiment in favor of a retreat from the strict nonexhaustion policy that emerged from that decision. 30 In Sebago, GB-Unic put
genuine Docksider and Sebago shoes up for sale in Belguim. GB-Unic had
purchased the shoes from a parallel importer in San Salvador and imported
them without getting consent from Sebago. The Belgian court referred two
questions in the matter to the ECJ: (1) whether article 7(1) provides for the
principle of international exhaustion of trademark rights and (2) whether there
is consent if the trademark proprietor markets one batch of a certain type of
goods within the EEA of which exhaustion is claimed or whether the owner's
consent must relate to each individual item of the product of which exhaustion
is claimed. The issue came down to whether or not the mark owner must
consent to the marketing of a product line or to each batch of a certain type of
product.
Question one was basically moot before hearing. Silhouette,decided in the
interim, settled the question that article seven does not provide for interna129

982 F.2d 642.

130See Case C-173/98, Sebago Inc., Ancienne Maison Dubois et Fils SA v. G-B Unic SA,

[1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 1317 (1999).
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tional exhaustion or leave it open to member states to provide in their domestic
law for exhaustion of the rights conferred by the trademark in respect of
products put on the market in non-member countries.
In spite of the considerable controversy surrounding its Silhouettedecision,
the ECJ did not utilize the factual differences between the two cases to permit
parallel importation of goods of exactly the same quality as those already on
the market in the EC with the proprietor's consent. Because Silhouette was
marketing particular styles of sunglasses in the EC,one could distinguish the
Sebago case on the grounds that Hartlauer was parallel importing outdated
models that Silhouette no longer wished to market in the EC. In Sebago it was
undisputed that the shoes were genuine. But, rather than eliminating the nonexhaustion principle for genuine goods that do not exhibit a material difference
from those already on the market, the court further entrenched the position it
promulgated in Silhouette.
Ruling on the question of consent, the court considered the arguments of
both parties. Sebago maintained that the trademark owner's consent must be
obtained for each defined batch of goods. GB-Unic argued that the proprietor
of the mark impliedly consents to the marketing within the EEA of the whole
product line when the mark owner has consented to marketing of individual
batches within the EEA.13 1 In sum, GB-Unic maintained that parallel goods
can be opposed pursuant to article 7(1) only when the mark owner has yet to
commence marketing an identical or similar product within the EEA. The
court rejected GB-Unic's argument, reasoning that to accept it would be to
impose a de facto rule of international exhaustion. 132 Thus, all parallel imports
would necessarily be admitted into the EEA. Perhaps recognizing this
approach is more favorable to the consumer and that one would be hard
pressed to come up with reasons why parallel imports of this nature should be
excluded, the court explained that it would be overreaching to interpret article
seven in order to achieve such an objective, 33stating that the court could not be
expected to "stand legislation on its head."'
The ECJ did not retreat from its prior position in Silhouette, yet reform may
still be sought at the commission level. 34 Indeed, the court referred to the
appropriate remedy, in this case, should the directive be found to produce
"unacceptable" results: take legislative action and amend it. Already the
commission has announced its intention to conduct a study on the economic

, See id.at 1325.
,32
See id. at 1326.
133 Id.
134See

id.
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impact of the Silhouette decision.'35 This study will result either in new
legislation favoring the parallel importer or in an endorsement of the policies
36
behind the court's refusal to provide for international trademark exhaustion.'1
Until the results are in, the rules are black and white and, as they have been
interpreted, leave little room for the gray.

"' See Anna Carboni, Cases About Spectacles and Torches: Now Can We See the Light?,
1998 E.I.P.R. 470,473 (1998).
36 See id. at 473.

